This Comment explores the mend the hold doctrine and its "vexing" 5 Erie analysis. Part I sketches the doctrinal distinctions between mend the hold, equitable estoppel, and judicial estoppel, and then presents an outline of mend the hold as a rule of contract law. With that background in place, Part I explores some of the more significant modern manifestations of the mend the hold principle in the law of contracts. Part II considers whether federal courts sitting in diversity should enforce the mend the hold doctrine. First, it contrasts mend the hold with the flexible pleading requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Second, it examines the operation of the doctrine in light of Erie's "twin aims" of avoiding forum shopping and inequitable administration of the law. 6 The first half of Part H argues that no Federal Rule directly conflicts with the doctrine, and thus the Rules pose no bar to its application in federal diversity actions. The second half argues that, under Erie, mend the hold is a substantive rule of law. This Comment concludes, therefore, that mend the hold is the sort of state prerogative that federal courts sitting in diversity must respect.
I. THE "MEND THE HOLD" DOCTRINE
Before exploring the mend the hold doctrine in detail, it is helpful to compare judicial and equitable estoppel to mend the hold. Because all three doctrines have common historical roots and share the characteristic of denying a party the right to shift its position from one asserted earlier, they are sometimes confused.' 7 Nevertheless, their present doctrinal definitions are quite distinct.
A. Mend the Hold, Equitable Estoppel, and Judicial Estoppel
The mend the hold doctrine, in its majority (and most severe) form, limits a party's defenses for breaking a contract to those based on a prelitigation explanation for nonperformance given to the other party. 8 The most common justification for the doctrine " Northrop Corp v Litronic Industries, 29 F3d 1173 , 1177 (7th Cir 1994 . " Hanna v Plumer, 380 US 460, 468 (1965) . 7 The similarity between the mend the hold doctrine and judicial estoppel has not gone Unnoticed by the courts. See Harbor Insurance, 922 F2d at 364 (distinguishing mend the hold from judicial estoppel).
Is See, for example, Heidner, 199 P2d at 484 ("Since the defendant here, before litigation was commenced, gave only as its reason for nonperformance a ground which was inadequate, it could not, after suit was filed, 'mend its hold' and rely upon other and different defenses. It was limited in the trial to the single defense it asserted at the time of breach.").
is that it allows a contracting party to rely on the given explanation as exclusive. Thus, if the party willing to perform wishes to save the deal, it may try to obviate the other party's reason for not performing with the assurance that other impediments to performance are not lurking in the background.' 9 The mend the hold doctrine, by definition, applies only to contract disputes. 20 The doctrine of equitable estoppel differs from mend the hold in that it binds a party to a prior position during subsequent litigation only if the other party has relied to its detriment on that prior position. 21 This requirement of detrimental reliance reflects equitable estoppel's underlying policy of protecting litigants from "less than scrupulous opponents." 2 In contrast, mend the hold has the narrower focus of ensuring an opportunity to cure.
The third doctrine, judicial estoppel, bars a party from asserting a position inconsistent with one that it prevailed with in a prior litigation.' Unlike mend the hold and equitable estoppel, which focus on the effect of shifting positions on the other party, judicial estoppel aims to protect the integrity of the judicial system. The doctrine prevents peijury and ensures that no two courts rule in a party's favor on conflicting theories, for then one would have to be wrong. 2 ' As with equitable estoppel, judicial estoppel is applicable in any type of case, not just contract disputes. " See, for example, Nashville Marketplace Co v First Capital Institutional Real Estate, Ltd, 1990 Tenn App LEXIS 212, *16 ("Nashville Marketplace could have attempted to cure these problems before the expiration of the earn-out period had they been mentioned in the rejection notice."); Duclos v Cunningham, 102 NY 678, 679, 6 NE 790, 790 (1886) ("No such objection was taken at the time by the defendants, and, had it been, the difficulty, no doubt, would have been obviated at once by the [broker] ."). See, for example, Friel v Jones, 42 Del Chanc 148, 153-54, 206 A2d 232, 235 (1964) (recognizing the mend the hold principle, but finding it inapplicable on the facts of the case presented because the claim did not arise from contractual rights).
21 See, for example, Schroeder v Texas Iron Works, Inc, 813 SW2d 483, 489 (Tex 1991 ) (explaining that equitable estoppel requires a showing of "(1) a false representation or concealment of material facts, (2) made with knowledge, actual or constructive, of those facts, (3) with the intention that it should be acted on, (4) to a party without knowledge, or the means of knowledge of those facts, (5) who detrimentally relied upon the misrepresentation").
" Edwards v Aetna Life Insurance Co, 690 F2d 595, 598 (6th Cir 1982) .
Id; Chaveriat v Williams Pipe Line Co, 11 F3d 1420, 1427-28 (7th Cir 1993).
See Rissetto v Plumbers and Steamfitters Local, 94 F3d 597, 600-01 (9th Cir 1996) (explaining that judicial estoppel "precludes a party from gaining an advantage by taking one position, and then seeking a second advantage by taking an incompatible one"); Chaveriat, 11 F3d at 1427-28 (explaining that courts enforce judicial estoppel "to prevent situations from arising in which one of two related decisions has to be wrong because a party took opposite positions and won both times"); Edwards, 690 F2d at 598 (explaining that judicial estoppel protects the integrity of the judicial process by avoiding inconsistent judicial decisions).
With the distinctions between these three doctrines established, an examination of mend the hold's evolution as a rule of contract law will further illustrate how it differs from judicial and equitable estoppel. This history will also shed light on why modern courts continue to confuse the three.
B. Evolution of Mend the Hold as an Independent Contract Rule
In its majority version, the mend the hold doctrine limits a nonperforming party's potential defenses for breaking a contract to those based on the prelitigation explanation for nonperformance that was given to the other party.' In its minority form, mend the hold permits the changing of a contracting party's litigation posture only when that change comports with the implied duty of good faith that modem courts read into every contract." Both versions of the doctrine trace their roots to the Supreme Court's 1877 opinion in Railway Co v McCarthy, 7 the first reported decision to use the phrase.
In McCarthy, the defendant railroad refused to perform on a delivery contract, explaining that it lacked enough cars to make the delivery." After the litigation began, the railroad, having fortuitously refused to perform on a Sunday, tried to defend its nonperformance under West Virginia's Sunday Law, which forbade Sunday (Sabbath) deliveries. 29 The Supreme Court affirmed the trial judge's refusal to instruct the jury on the Sunday law defense, calling it "an after-thought[ I suggested by the pressure and exigencies of the case." ' It further explained:
Where a party gives a reason for his conduct and decision touching any thing involved in a controversy, he cannot, after litigation has begun, change his ground, and put his conduct upon another and a different consideration. sions.' Indeed, some courts focused on the mention of"estoppe[]" in the passage and therefore refused to enforce mend the hold independently of equitable estoppel.' The Supreme Court also quoted the McCarthy mend the hold passage in its first judicial estoppel case, causing confusion that lingers even today. 36 Although they lack the catchy wrestling phrase, a number of pre-McCarthy opinions employ mend the hold reasoning, of which the McCarthy Court cited six. Three of these cases, Everett v Saltus," 7 Holbrook v Wight, 8 and Winter v Coit, 39 were actions of replevin or trover stemming from contractual relationships.° In each, the court rejected the defendant's claim of a lien on the contested property, reasoning that the defendant had failed to assert that defense at the time the plaintiff (or the plaintiff's agent) demanded return of the property. 4 ' Put another way, these courts held that the defendants' prelitigation explanations barred them from mending their hold at trial.
The other three cases cited by the McCarthy Court involved waivers of arguments by failure to assert them when rejecting a tender. In Wright v Reed, 42 a 1790 English case, one judge opined that because no objection was made at the time, "bank notes" drawn on the Bank of England constituted a valid performance even though the contract called for consideration in "money."' In Gould v Banks & Gould, 4 " a New York trial court found that the plaintiff had stated at the time that he would not accept a shipment of books because they were in poor condition, not because they were late. Therefore, it held that "[ulpon well settled principles, this was a waiver of all other objections to the tender." 45 Finally, only seven years before McCarthy, the New York Court of Appeals in Duffy v O'Donovan 4 e explained:
It is urged that the tender was insufficient, as it was not in money. But it was not refused for that reason. It was rejected because not made in time, and not because the certified check was not money or legal tender. It cannot now be objected, that the party could not have been compelled to accept a certified check in lieu of money. He waived his right to demand the money by not asserting it at the proper time.... The objection to the tender could have been obviated, and, therefore, was waived, not having been taken. 47 Building upon this foundation, courts in the early 1900s further developed the doctrine.' Some limited its application to posing the question of lien to rest on what the defendant's partner said when the demand was made, omitting to mention a lien and taking other ground, waives it."); Winter, 7 NY at 293-94 ("The jury were properly instructed as to the waiver of the defendants' lien for their charges for insurance, freight, cartage, labor, storage and fire insurance, that if on being apprised of the plaintiffs claim, they put themselves not upon their lien but only upon the denial of plaintiff's right, they could now assume a different ground."), citing cases in which the party asserting the doctrine could have cured the reason for the other party's nonperformance. 49 (The language in Duffy excerpted above suggests this limitation.) Other courts, in what would lead to the modern majority rule, applied an absolute form of the doctrine. That is, these courts limited a breaching party's defenses to a prelitigation explanation for nonperformance regardless of that party's good faith reasons for changing positions and the other party's ability to cure.' Foreshadowing what would become the modern minority rule, the Supreme Court of Michigan connected the rule to the obligation of contracting parties to act in good faith. 5 Finally, departing from the context of contracts and estoppel, some post-McCarthy courts employed the phrase "mend the hold" to refer to the familiar rule of appellate procedure that arguments not raised at trial are waived on appeal; 52 to sundry other Sunday law part of McCarthy as "more or less obiter'); Continental National Bank v National City Bank of New York, 69 F2d 312, 318-19 (9th Cir 1934) (collecting cases and describing the conflict among the courts in interpreting the McCarthy rule). See also Larson, 116 NE2d at 192 ("This is how the doctrine emerges from the cases which have considered it.... [T] his is the common method for the development of our law....').
" See, for example, Continental National Bank, 69 F2d at 319 ("In the relevant cases in this circuit, the requirement that the plaintiff should have been misled to his damage has not been expressly stated, but it appeared from the facts that there was some possibility that he might have cured the defects had they been called to his attention, although perhaps not within the time limits of the contract."); Western Grocer Co v New York Oversea Co, 28 F2d 518, 520-21 (N D Cal 1928) ("A party to a contract is not permitted to refuse to perform a contract upon one ground, and later to rely upon another ground, which might have been remedied, had it been called to the attention of the performing party."). See, for example, Luckenbach S.S. Co, Inc v W.R. Grace & Co, 267 F 676, 679 (4th Cir 1920) ("But the further and equally conclusive answer is found in the settled rule of law that one who breaches his contract for reasons specified at the time will not be permitted afterwards, when sued for damages, to set up other and different defenses. This rule has been long established and frequently applied."); Wyatt v Henderson, 31 Or 48, 54, 48 P 790, 792 (1897) ("The defendants, having denied, upon information and belief, that the plaintiff was the owner or entitled to the possession of any of the said oats, cannot now be permitted to say that their refusal to deliver the grain in question was caused by the failure of the plaintiff to pay the storage thereon.").
" Smith, County Treasurer v German Insurance Co, 107 Mich 270, 279, 65 NW 236, 239 (1895) ("It is apparent that the ground, and the only ground, upon which all liability was denied, was the storage of gasoline .... Good faith required that the [insurance] company should apprise the plaintiff fully of its position; and, failing to do this, it estops itself from asserting any defense other than that brought to the notice of plaintiff.").
See, for example, Vileski v Pacific-Atlantic Steamship Co, 163 F2d 553, 555-56 (9th Cir 1947) (explaining that the "lilibelant on this appeal seeks to raise a new issue," but holding that the "libelant is not entitled so to mend his hold"); Arkansas Anthracite Coal & Land Co v Stokes, 2 F2d 511, 515 (8th Cir 1924) ("But it is also well-nigh universal and fundamental, as a rule of appellate procedure, that a litigant may not mend his hold on the way up to an appellate court by seeking to reverse a case, because the theory on which it was tried below, and in which appellants then acquiesced, is, in fact, erroneous. In short, to state the rule simply and baldly, the theory on which a case is tried nisi is the theory in which it must, on appeal, be weighed for error."); Bob v Hardy, 222 Ga App 550, rules barring amendment of one's position; 53 and to describe the shifting of one's grounds." None of these uses is particularly relevant to the present inquiry into the contract law mend the hold principle, other than perhaps to illustrate that several judges have (or had) a tendency to use the phrase repeatedly, suggesting that, although possibly quirky" or quaint," this relatively esoteric phrase endears itself to those who encounter it. 5 " C. The Majority Rule: Prelitigation Presently, the dominant form of the mend the hold doctrine limits a contracting party's defenses for nonperformance to those based on explanations given at the time of the nonperformance. Hence the doctrine binds contracting parties, during litigation, to 554 73-74 (1954) ("At. that time defendant's expressed reluctance to proceed with the work resulted from his belief that the bid price was too low to cover the cost of labor and materials. He did not indicate by his statements that refusal to do the work contemplated was, or would be, predicated on the theory that acceptance of the offer was precluded because of delay on the plaintiffs part. The failure to assign such reason is significant."), citing McCarthy, 96 US at 267-68; Design Data Corp v Maryland Casualty Co, 243 Neb 945, 956-57, 503 NW2d 552, 559-60 (1993) (refusing to apply the otherwise alive "rule as to 'mending one's hold' in disputes involving insurance coverage); Schanerman v Everett & Carbin, Inc, 10 NJ 215, 220-21, 89 A2d 689, 692 (1952) (disallowing an argument based on the buyer's financial ability because the 'prospective seller in refusing to execute the contract asserted simply that it was withdrawing the property from the market and did not question the buyer's financial ability"); Corporacion De Mercadeo Agricola v Mellon Bank International, 608 F2d 43, 48-49 (2d Cir 1979) (explaining that, under New York law, "when a bank offers one reason for refusing a draft on a letter of credit, and that reason is later refuted, it cannot at trial point to an entirely different reason for sustaining the refusal"); Wyoming Sawmills, Inc v Transportation Insurance Co, 282 Or 401, 408-10, 578 P2d 1253, 1257-58 (1978) (In Banc) (limiting the rule, "which is securely rooted in common justice," in insurance cases so as not to create "an original grant of coverage where no such contract previously existed") (internal citations and quotation marks omitted); Nashville Marketplace Co, 1990 Tenn App LEXIS 212 at *16 ("Admittedly, the contract documents did not specifically require the First Capital defendants to set out the grounds for their rejection of a lease. However, once a contracting party has given reasons for its actions, it cannot* attempt to justify its conduct on new and different grounds after suit is filed."); Measday v Kwik-Kopy Corp, 713 F2d 118, 125-26 (5th Cir 1983) ("In Texas when an employer assigns grounds for discharge of an employee, it cannot later justify the termination on grounds that were not made the basis of the termination at the time of the discharge. The majority rule is one of general application, meaning that it does not discriminate between types of contracts. 59 Nevertheless, the rule has been discussed as especially applicable to insurance coverage° and real estate brokerage contract disputes, 61 and in both of these contexts, some courts have limited the rule's otherwise wide reach. 6 2 Similarly, UCC § 2-605 modifies the rule in disputes over contracts for the sale of goods.'
1. Mend the hold in the insurance context.
The comparatively more frequent use of the mend the hold doctrine in insurance cases may stem from insurance companies' practice of writing letters to policyholders to explain their reasons for denying a claim. Certainly at a minimum these letters, typically referred to as "declination letters," ameliorate the problems of proof associated with a verbal refusal to perform. Whatever the reason for its more frequent invocation in insurance disputes, this relative frequency has engendered a number of interesting doctrinal developments.
For example, the Vermont Supreme Court has recast the doctrine as the "insurance defense waiver rule.' 4 Vermont courts justify this version of the doctrine with a "public policy" of honesty.' The motivating notion is to hold an insurer to his word once he "puts his refusal to pay on a specified ground."' Vermont courts operate on the assumption that the insured has relied on the declination letter in bringing the suit, 67 thus moving the doctrine closer to equitable estoppel. Yet despite these nuances, the See, for example, Nashville Marketplace Co, 1990 Term App LEXIS 212 at *16 ("[O]nce a contracting party has given reasons for its actions, it cannot attempt to justify its conduct on new and different grounds after suit is filed.").
See, for example, Hamlin, 487 A2d at 161-63 & n 2 (discussing the "insurance defense waiver rule").
"1 See 12 Am Jur 2d Brokers § 251 (1997) ("As a general rule, where a landowner who has listed property for sale with a real estate broker refuses to accept an offer which is substantially in accordance with the listing, the owner cannot afterwards defend the broker's action for compensation on a ground not specified when rejecting the offer.").
For examples of courts that have limited mend the hold's application in the insurance and real estate contexts, see Parts I.C.1 and I.C. Id. Id (discussing the unfairness of allowing the insurance company to mend its hold "after the insured has taken him at his word and is attempting to enforce his liability").
insurance defense waiver rule appears to have little practical utility. Its effect is to give incentive to insurance companies simply to reserve all of their rights in a declination letter, rather than limiting themselves to a specific reason for refusing to pay. ' In contrast to Vermont, where the insurance defense waiver rule remains alive and well, 6 9 both Nebraska and Oregon have consistently eschewed enforcing a robust form of the doctrine in insurance coverage cases. 7° Both of these states have recently carved out an exception to mend the hold for policy exclusions and other defenses that go to the original scope of the coverage. That is, regardless of the reasons asserted in a prelitigation declination letter, in Nebraska (with an exception discussed below) and Oregon, an insurance company may always defend its refusal to pay by arguing that the insured's loss does not fall within the policy's ambit. 7 '
The Oregon exception incorporates into mend the hold the common rule of insurance law that policyholders cannot invoke estoppel to extend the scope of coverage. 72 The relevant inquiry 284, 291, 75 NW2d 739, 744 (1956) (refusing to bar an amendment because the "amended answer as to this subject did not" represent a change in "its defensive position"); Pickens v Maryland Casualty Co, 141 Neb 105, 110, 2 NW2d 593, 596 (1942) (allowing the insurance company to mend its hold because the declination letter "inadvertently" misstated the company's rationale and the "error was so patent that it can in no way prejudice the rights of defendant"). For Oregon examples, see Ward v Queen City Fire Insurance Co of Sioux Falls, 69 Or 347, 352, 138 P 1067 , 1068 (1914 (suggesting that mend the hold applies only to the extent that the party in breach was in full possession of "all the facts and circumstances"); Eaid v National Casualty Co, 122 Or 547, 557-59, 259 P 902, 906 (1927) (following Ward, and thus applying mend the hold because "the company had made a carefiul examination and investigation of the [plaintiff's] claim"). ' Design Data Corp v Maryland Casualty Co, 243 Neb 945, 957, 503 NW2d 552, 560 (1993) ("While the rule as to 'mending one's hold' may be alive and well as to conditions of forfeiture, generally it has no application to matters relating to coverage, and estoppel cannot be invoked to expand the scope of coverage of an insurance contract absent a showing of detrimental good faith reliance upon statements or conduct of the party against whom estoppel is invoked which reasonably led an insured to believe coverage was present."); ABCD... Vision, Inc v Fireman's Fund Insurance Co, 304 Or 301, 306, 744 P2d 998, 1001 (1987 thus becomes how to distinguish matters of forfeiture from questions about the scope of coverage. A forfeiture of coverage occurs when "there is insurance coverage for the loss in the first place, but acts of the insured nullify the coverage, such as the filing of a false statement... ." In other words, an insurance company in Oregon may always raise a policy exclusion defense 74 or argue that a claim does not fall "within the insuring clause originally granting coverage." 75 Insureds, however, may still defeat defenses based on a forfeiture argument (as opposed to a coverage argument) if the insurance company fails to raise that defense in its declination letter. 76 Two observations about this modification are worth noting. First, it provides another example of the influence of estoppel on the development of mend the hold; the change represents nothing more than the grafting of a limitation on estoppel onto the mend the hold doctrine. Second, so long as insurance companies consistently reserve all of their rights in their Oregon declination letters, the modification will have no practical effect.
The Nebraska version of this exception tracks the Oregon version-indeed, it was in part inspired by it.77 Nebraska, however, has added an additional wrinkle: plaintiffs showing "detrimental good faith reliance" may invoke "the rule as to 'mending one's hold" in disputes over coverage as well as forfeiture. ' " Design Data, 503 NW2d at 560 ("While the rule as to 'mending one's hold' may be alive and well as to conditions of forfeiture, generally it has no application to matters relating to coverage, and estoppel cannot be invoked to expand the scope of coverage of an insurance contract absent a showing of detrimental good faith reliance upon statements or conduct of the party against whom estoppel is invoked which reasonably led an insured to in Nebraska, mend the hold operates no differently than equitable estoppel in disputes over the scope of insurance coverage.
Mend the hold in the real estate context.
Whereas the use of mend the hold in insurance contract disputes is driven by notions of honesty and the difference between forfeiture and scope of coverage, the doctrine's application to brokerage contracts is animated by a desire to ensure to the broker an opportunity to cure cited defects in a tendered buyer's offer. 79 The idea is that the broker, who has a commission on the line, will work to "obtain concessions on minor problems from the prospective buyer." 80 But the traditional mend the hold rule created at best mixed incentives. It encouraged sophisticated sellers to couch their refusal of a prospective buyer in general terms, thereby protecting all possible defenses for potential subsequent litigation. 8 By virtue of the generality of the refusal, the seller deprived the broker of his opportunity to cure. 82 To avoid this problem, courts have limited the reach of mend the hold in brokerage contract disputes to curable defects."s Modern courts also require the seller to provide the broker with an explanation for rejecting a tendered buyer.' This modified mend believe coverage was present."). See also Erickson v Carhart, 1996 Neb App LEXIS 234, *16 (explaining that Design Data "limits the estoppel doctrine of 'mending one's hold' to prevent expansion of coverage beyond the policy terms absent detrimental reliance).
See (1954) ("The general rule, in this state and elsewhere, is that where a broker has produced a purchaser in substantial compliance with the terms of a listing, and the owner does not object to the terms of the proposed purchase or the details of performance but states as the reason for his refusal his unwillingness to sell, he may not shift his position, when sued for a commission, and defend upon objections to details that the broker might have supplied or corrected if they had been pointed out by the owner.").
Horton 191, 195 (1976) (recognizing the majority rule requires that the seller "show that the ground for rejection of an offer tendered to the seller by the broker was specified to the broker at that time'). the hold rule lessens the broker's vulnerability to opportunistic behavior by the seller while ensuring the broker an opportunity to cure insubstantial defects in the tendered buyer's offer. Thus, it represents a sensible change. This configuration of the doctrine may be subsumed within the more general rule that, in the face of curable defects in a tendered buyer's offer, the seller's silence waives those defects as defenses in a subsequent suit by the broker for his commission. Courts have embraced this more general rule almost universally." Moreover, the modified rule, by requiring disclosure of curable defects, is a more efficient route to protecting a broker from the seller's strategic behavior than either mend the hold (with its incentive structure stacked against helpful disclosures) or equitable estoppel (which does not foster disclosure of curable defects).
By tying the rule's operation to the lost opportunity to cure, and by creating an affirmative obligation on the part of the rejecting party, this configuration of the doctrine begins to resemble UCC § -2-605, a provision specifically designed to remedy the mixed incentives created by the common law version of mend the hold.
3. UCC § 2-605: A codification of mend the hold?
When the common law held exclusive dominion over disputes regarding contracts for the sale of goods, the application of mend the hold to a buyer's rejection of a seller's tender would have been straightforward: a buyer who gave an explanation for his rejection would be limited to that explanation as his only defense in a subsequent suit. 86 81-82, 150 NW2d 439, 443 (1967) . See also 12 Am Jur 2d Brokers § 251 (1997) ("As a general rule, where a landowner who has listed property for sale with a real estate broker refuses to accept an offer which is substantially in accordance with the listing, the owner cannot afterwards defend the broker's action for compensation on a ground not specified when rejecting the offer."); Annotation, Failure, when refusing offer to purchase land, to state ground therefor as affecting right to assert such ground in defense of brokers action for compensation, 156 ALR 602 (1945) . For an example of the explicit fusion of these rules, see Orange City Hills, Inc v Florida Realty Bureau, Inc, 119 S2d 43, 48-49 (Fla Dist Ct App 1960 ) (Wigginton dissenting), which cites both an earlier edition of the relevant Am Jur section and McCarthy's mend the hold language. See, for example, Littlejohn v Shaw, 159 NY 188, 191, 53 NE 810, 811 (1899) ("But in this case the defendants placed their rejection of the gambier upon two specific grounds, viz. that it was not of good merchantable quality, and that it was not in good merchantable condition. By thus formally stating their objections, they must be held to have waived all other objections. The principle is plain, and needs no argument in support of it, that, if a particular objection is taken to the performance, and the party is silent as to all others, they are deemed to be waived."). See also text accompanying notes 42-47. kerage contracts, the traditional mend the hold rule created an incentive not to disclose even curable defects for fear of being limited to that defense in later litigation.1 7 It also "penalized the buyer who gave a quick and informal notice of specific defects upon rejection.' The Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC") attempted to remedy these problems. UCC § 2-605 provides: The buyer's failure to state in connection with rejection a particular defect which is ascertainable by reasonable inspection precludes him from relying on the unstated defect to justify rejection or to establish breach.., where the seller could have cured it if stated seasonably. 89 This configuration incorporates the most salutary aspects of traditional mend the hold without its unfortunate side effect of mixed incentives. In the words of Section 2-605's official commentary:
The present section rests upon a policy of permitting the buyer to give a quick and informal notice of defects in a tender without penalizing him for omissions in his statement, while at the same time protecting a seller who is reasonably misled by the buyer's failure to state curable defects." Although judicial exegesis of Section 2-605 is scarce, courts have applied it without difficulty, 9 ' and one court even noted the connection between Section 2-605 and mend the hold. 92
Hawkland, Uniform Commercial Code Series at § 2-605:01 (cited in note 81) ("This rule led sophisticated buyers to object to the seller's tender in a general nonspecific fashion and to base rejection on all available grounds. The case law supported this approach, generally holding that if the buyer rejected without specifying any reason other than the general allegation that the goods did not conform to the contract, he had the right thereafter to rely on any defects or noncomformities to support his action.").
T Id.
-UCC § 2-605 (1) 
D. The Minority Rule: Postlitigation Good Faith
Massachusetts and Texas have both explicitly rejected the majority, prelitigation version of mend the hold.' In these two states, a party to a contract suit may advance any defense regardless of whether that party gave a different explanation at the time of nonperformance. However, both Massachusetts and Texas have restricted this general rule, and disallow new defenses when the nonperforming party changes positions in bad faith." Although the precise definition of "bad faith" is unclear, the courts of both states distinguish bad faith from detrimental reliance, 9 6 rating the mend the hold rule into a 1930 Oregon statute that resembles modem day UCC § 2-605). ' See UCC § 2-605 comment 2 (explaining that "a buyer who merely rejects the delivery without stating his objections to it is probably acting in commercial bad faith"); UCC If it does so, the non-occurrence of the condition is excused .... This is a specific application of the general rule that requires good faith and fair dealing....").
New Accent Builders, 679 SW2d at 110 ("Thus under our holding the question for the jury was not whether Accent intended to terminate for convenience, but instead whether it acted in bad faith or whether Southwest changed its position in reliance."); New England Structures, 234 NE2d at 891-92 ("While of course one cannot fail in good faith in presenting his reasons as to his conduct touching a controversy he is not prevented from relying suggesting that the bad faith inquiry is distinct from the reliance inquiry under equitable estoppel.
The Illinois lower courts-despite the Illinois Supreme Court's 1905 explicit adoption of the traditional McCarthy mend the hold rule 9 7 -have similarly recast the rule so that it no longer applies to prelitigation statements." This modification began in 1953 with Larson v Johnson. 9 9 The Larson court, after rejecting an argument that mend the hold was no more than a fancy name for equitable estoppel,"°o announced that it would refuse to enforce mend the hold where "the casual character of the repudiation.., would [make it] inequitable to apply the doctrine...."10o The court also confirmed the doctrine's status as a rule of contract law, noting that mend the hold "expresse[s] and intend [s] something more with respect to the conduct of one who enters into a solemn written engagement and then repudiates it." 10 ' Thus, the court grounded the doctrine in what is described today as the implied duty of good faith between contracting parties.°3
Since then, Illinois courts have used mend the hold to limit contracting parties to positions taken during (not before) the litigation only." A party defending a refusal to perform must "stand upon one good defense among others urged simply because he has not always put it forward, when it does not appear that he has acted dishonestly or that the other party has been misled to his harm, or that he is estopped on any other ground.").
' 1184, 1191 (1996) ("Illinois law requires a defendant in a breach of contract claim to stand by the first defense raised after the litigation has begun. However, the law does not require that the defense be asserted at the time the contract is terminated.&").
1 Ill App 2d 36, 116 NE2d 187 (1953) . 00116 NE2d at 191 ("We have concluded from our examination of the cases that so far as the Illinois doctrine is concerned, it is not limited to equitable estoppel. The reviewing courts ... were familiar with the doctrine of equitable estoppel and there was no occasion for dressing it up with a subtitle.").
" by the first defense raised after the litigation has begun."°5 Litigation has "begun" once it has moved beyond the initial pleadings stage." The idea is to allow the defendant time to put together his defense, 0 7 but once that time is up, the duty of good faith between contracting parties requires the defendant to proffer all of his defenses or lose them forever. ' Whether the Illinois Supreme Court would approve of tying the doctrine to the duty of good faith is uncertain.'" But in the face of that court's silence on the subject since 1912, the present understanding of the test in Illinois for an impermissible attempt to mend the hold is whether the change in litigation posture is made in good faith." 0 Importantly, in this configuration, the Illinois version of mend the hold purports to do the same thing-at least once the litigation has begun-as the Texas and Massachusetts rule proscribing bad faith alterations to argument. However, because Texas and Massachusetts have no decisional law to illustrate the application of their bad faith test, this conclusion is not certain."' at trial.") (emphasis added).
' 1996) . "The Delaney court relied on Judge Posner's opinion in Harbor Insurance as an authoritative exposition of the limits of mend the hold. Delaney, 627 NE2d at 249. In fact, the Harbor Insurance court was operating with a concession by the party seeking to employ the doctrine that sharply limited the doctrine's scope to avoid a head-on collision between the doctrine and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 922 F2d at 364 ("It concedes that if pretrial discovery or other sources of new information justify a change in a contract party's litigating position as a matter of fair procedure under the federal rules, that change should not be deemed a forbidden attempt to 'mend the hold.-). Moreover, to the extent that the Delaney court justified its limitation of the doctrine to postpleading stage amendments because "no case law . . . clearly holds that the doctrine applies at the pleading stage," 627 NE2d at 239, the court was in error. In the Illinois Supreme Court's decision in Schuyler County, for example, the defendant won a county construction bid, but then announced by letter that it could not perform at the bid price, that the bid was a mistake. In the subsequent breach of contract action, the court limited the defendant to that explanation, which was made well before the litigation commenced. 100 NE at 240.
... Thus, in Horwitz-Matthews, an appeal from a dismissal below before the defendants had filed an answer, the Seventh Circuit opined that, even though the pleadings were not yet complete, "the 'mend the hold' doctrine" would not permit the defendant to change its position because it had "emphatically asserted [ed] 
A. Does a Federal Rule Preempt Mend the Hold?
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the "pleadings kick off a course of pretrial discovery expected to result in modifications in the parties' positions."" 7 Mend the hold thus stands in stark contrast to the spirit of the Federal Rules, for application of mend the hold would rigidify "the system of pleading that the [Federal Rules] seek to make supple.""' The question, however, is whether there is a specific Federal Rule whose interpretation "is 'sufficiently broad' [as] to cause a 'direct collision' with" mend the hold, "thereby leaving no room for the operation of" the doctrine."' The likeliest candidates are Rules 8 and 15.
Rule 8.
Rule 8(e)(2) permits parties to federal litigation to raise "as many separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless of consistency," subject only to the ethical commands of Rule 11.120 In contrast, the majority version of mend the hold limits a party's defenses to those based on the explanation for nonperformance given at the time of that nonperformance. The relevant determination is whether these rules can coexist, "each controlling its own intended sphere of coverage .... 11 2 An expansive reading of Rule 8 conflicts with mend the hold; 1 2 2 the Rule explicitlj permits all parties, including contract litigants, to state as many defenses as they wish. The Supreme Court, however, has instructed courts construing the Federal Rules for these purposes to be sensitive to the state's interest in its rule. 23 So a better interpretation is that "'Harbor Insurance, 922 F2d at 364. "8'Id.
"'Burlington Northern, 480 US at 4-5 (1987) (citations omitted). See also Wright, Miller, and Cooper, 19 Federal Practice and Procedure § 4510 at 293 (cited in note 13) (explaining that "a precondition to the applicability of a Civil Rule in the face of contrary state law" is that "it must first be determined that the Rule, properly construed, truly comprehends the disputed issue and, therefore, is in conflict with state law").
F'FRCP 8(e)(2). See also FRCP 11 (requiring parties to certify that their contentions are not baseless). Rule 8 permits litigants to raise any and all defenses that survive the mend the hold rule, regardless of their consistency." 2 Unlike Burlington Northern Railroad Co v Woods," where the Supreme Court held that a Federal Rule preempted state law because their operations and underlying purposes conflicted, the suggested interpretation gives effect to the policies animating both Rule 8 and mend the hold. After all, Rule 8 is designed "to liberate pleaders from the inhibiting requirement of technical consistency."" u Mend the hold, on the other hand, is concerned not with technical consistency between a party's various arguments, but with avoiding the lost opportunities to cure that result from the performing party's reliance on the nonperforming party's explanation. 27 Thus, Rule 8 leaves room for the operation of mend the hold because the doctrine permits inconsistent pleadings; it only limits the universe of potentially inconsistent arguments to those based on the explanation given at the time of nonperformance.
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Rule 8 poses less of an obstacle to the minority version of mend the hold because it applies only to the pleadings." 2 In contrast, the Illinois version of mend the hold only applies once the indicates a turn in the Court's approach to the Erie doctrine, a Federal rule will apply in the face of a contrary state rule only when the Federal Rule sets an explicit standard leaving the courts little room for interpretation... ."). See also S.A. Healy Co, 60 F3d at 310-12 (holding that a state rule regarding settlement offers by plaintiffs is compatible with Rule 68's control over settlement offers by defendant), cited with approval in Gasperini, 518 US at 421 n 7; Richard H. Fallon, Daniel J. Meltzer, and David L. Shapiro, Hart and Wechsler's The Federal Courts and the Federal System 729-30 (Foundation 4th ed 1996) (noting that the Court continues to interpret the Federal Rules to avoid conflict with important state interests), cited with approval in Gasperini, 518 US at 437-38 n 22. Compare Stewart Organization, 487 US at 37-38 (Scalia dissenting) ("Thus, in deciding whether a federal procedural statute or Rule of Procedure encompasses a particular issue, a broad reading that would create significant disuniformity between state and federal courts should be avoided if the text permits.").
"Compare Trierweiler, 90 F3d at 1540 (interpreting Rule 11 so as to avoid a direct collision with a Colorado statute).
1-480 US 1, 7 (1987) ("Thus, the Rule's discretionary mode of operation unmistakably conflicts with the mandatory provision ofAlabama's affirmance penalty statute. Moreover, the purposes underlying the Rule are sufficiently coextensive with the asserted purposes of the Alabama statue to indicate that the Rule occupies the statute's field of operation so as to preclude its application in federal diversity actions."). Compare Exxon Corp v Burglin, 42 F3d 948, 950 (5th Cir 1995) ("By allowing even minimal recovery of attorneys' fees in every civil appeal, Alaska Rule 508 directly collides with FRAP 38, which allows the recovery of attorneys' fees only in the case of a frivolous appeal. (West 2d ed 1990) .
"See, for example, Nashville Marketplace Co, 1990 Tenn App LEXIS 212 at *16 ("Nashville Marketplace could have attempted to cure these problems before the expiration of the earn-out period had they been mentioned in the rejection notice.").
"See notes 119, 123 and accompanying text. .. FRCP 8.
pleadings are complete. 130 Thus, the two doctrines do not collide. Moreover, even if courts were to apply mend the hold to the pleadings stage,' it still would not conflict with Rule 8. The Illinois version of the doctrine does not purport to limit contracting parties' freedom to plead all of their claims or defenses regardless of consistency. 132 Thus, neither the majority nor the minority version of the mend the hold doctrine conflict with Rule 8 to such an extent as to preempt the doctrine's application by federal diversity courts.
Rule 15.
Rule 15(a) provides that.any party may amend its pleadings "by leave of court," which "leave shall be freely given when justice so requires."'" Therefore one can easily imagine a situation where the Rule appears to conflict with the majority version of mend the hold. A party to a contract might give an insufficient explanation for its nonperformance at the time of the breach. Then, during the course of discovery, this party learns of other facts that would have excused its nonperformance. By its terms, Rule 15 appears to allow the party to amend its pleadings to include the new defense-to mend its hold. Thus, if "justice requires" a court to hear the newly discovered defense, Rule 15 may preempt mend the hold. There is, however, an equally plausible interpretation of Rule 15-one that is more sensitive to the relevant state interests. Under this interpretation, a party to a breach of contract suit may seek leave to amend its pleadings to raise any issue except those lost by virtue of the mend the hold doctrine. The key to this interpretation is the term "justice." "Justice" can also be served by forbidding a party from mending its hold." M Indeed, the judicial gloss on Rule 15 is consistent with the suggested interpretation: courts routinely reject amendments for, 'See Delaney v Marchon, Inc, 254 Il App 3d 933, 940-41, 627 NE2d 244, 249 (1993) .
The court in In re Apex Automotive Warehouse LP, avoided a conflict between Illinois mend the hold and the Federal Rules by refusing to apply the doctrine "at the pleading among other reasons, bad faith and undue prejudice." Reading mend the hold into Rule 15's "justice" language retains liberal federal pleading while also giving effect to the states' mend the hold rule.
A recent Sixth Circuit decision illustrates the thrust of the suggested approach.
1 6 The district court had excluded a defense based on "newly discovered evidence" on grounds other than the mend the hold doctrine.' On appeal, the Sixth Circuit characterized the exclusion as "unjust under the facts and circumstances of this case. " " Nevertheless, demonstrating how the Federal Rules and mend the hold could peaceably coexist, the court held that the defense could not be raised because "the law of Tennessee precludes" defendants from "justifying their conduct retroactively on a ground that is different from that which was proffered at the time of" nonperformance." 9 Similar analysis reveals no direct conflict between Rule 15 and the minority version of mend the hold. At first it might ap-" 'See Foman u Davis, 371 US 178, 182 (1962) (holding that leave to amend should be "freely given" absent bad faith, undue prejudice, and certain other reasons); In re Southmark Corp, 88 F3d 311, 314-15 (5th Cir 1996) Garner v Kinnerar Manufacturing Co, 37 F3d 263, 269 (7th Cir 1994) ("While leave to amend should be freely given when justice requires, district courts have broad discretion to deny motions to amend in cases of undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motives, repeated failure to cure deficiencies by amendments previously allowed, undue prejudice or futility.'); Fuller v Secretary of Defense, 30 F3d 86, 88 (8th Cir 1994) (explaining that "W1]eave to amend should be granted absent a good reason for the denial, such as undue delay, bad faith, undue prejudice to the nonmoving party, or futility"). If justice excludes amendments in cases of bad faith, prejudice, dilatory motives, and so forth, why not add mend the hold to the list? Compare note 143 and accompanying text.
"uLife Care Centers of America v Charles Town Associates Limited Partnership, LP1MC, Inc, 79 F3d 496,508-09 (6th Cir 1996) .
is Id. " 3 Id at 508.
"Id at 508-09. Although characterizing the rule as resting on "estoppel grounds," the court noted that the Tennessee rule represents an adoption of the McCarthy rule. Id at 508 & n 9. This confusion stems from the use of the word estoppel in the McCarthy opinion: "He is not permitted thus to mend his hold. He is estopped from doing it by a settled principle of law." McCarthy, 96 US at 267-68 (emphasis added). Compare notes 18-22, 33-34 and accompanying text. Notwithstanding this confusion, the rule that "once a contracting party has given reasons for its actions, it cannot attempt to justify its conduct on new and different grounds after suit is filed," Life Care Centers, 79 F3d at 508, quoting Nashville Marketplace, 1990 Tenn App LEXIS 212 at *16, is a manifestation of the mend the hold principle outlined in Part I.
pear that by permitting changes in position only when those changes comport with the duty of good faith, the minority version of mend the hold operates in the same field as Rule 15(a). 10 District courts, however, have wide latitude to deny leave to amend when the amendment is not proposed in good faith. Thus, Rule 15(a) and the minority version of mend the hold can be harmonized: the Rule does not require that federal district courts grant leave to amend when the amendment is an attempt to mend the hold, because by definition in Illinois an attempt to mend the hold is an amendment not made in good faith. Following this approach, in a case where a party sought leave to add a defense that it had been aware of since its original pleading, one district court fused Illinois mend the hold with Rule 15 to bar the amendment. The preemption analysis, however, resolves only half of the issue. The next question is whether mend the hold is a substantive rule of law that, under Erie, federal courts sitting in diversity " 'See generally Stewart Organization, Inc v Ricoh Corp, 487 US 22, 31 (1988) Canada, Ltd, 965 F2d 195, 199 (7th Cir 1992) (collecting doctrines, including mend the hold, that "mix procedural or evidentiary with substantive policy concerns"); Ashley S. Deeks, Comment, Raising the Cost of Lying: Rethinking Erie for Judicial Estoppel, 64 U Chi L Rev 873, 884 (1997) (explaining that judicial estoppel "resists easy classification as either substantive or procedural").
" 'See Barron, 965 F2d at 199 (explaining that "a substantive rule is concerned with the channeling of behavior outside the courtroom").
1518 US 415, 428 (1996) ("Informed by these decisions, we address the question whether [the state law in question] is outcome-affective in this sense: Would 'application of the [standard] ... have so important an effect upon the fortunes of one or both of the litigants that failure to [apply] it would [unfairly discriminate against citizens of the forum State, or] be likely to caus6 a plaintiff to choose the federal court"), citing Hanna, 380 US at 468 (tying Guaranty Trust's "outcome determination" test to "the twin aims of the Erie rule"). See also Fragoso, 991 F2d at 881-82 (holding that a Puerto Rico rule was procedural because refusing to apply it in federal court would not "influence a litigant's choice of forum"; would not "advantage [federal plaintiffs] as compared with similarly situated, non-diverse plaintiffs"; and would not "bear in the slightest on the substantive outcome of the appeal"). Although Gasperini also considered whether the New York rule in question impinged on an "essential characteristic" of the federal courts, see 518 US at 431, quoting Byrd, 356 US at 537, this Comment ignores that question because the only potential conflicting federal interest, the Federal Rules, does not conflict with the doctrine, see Part IIA, whereas the state rule under consideration in Gasperini raised Seventh positive question is whether the state rule is outcome determinative when considered in light of Erie's twin aims of avoiding forum shopping and an inequitable administration of the laws.
1.
Erie and the majority (prelitigation) version of mend the hold.
While the majority version of mend the hold presented a challenging analysis when deciding whether it conflicted with the Federal Rules, its treatment under traditional Erie twin aims analysis is less difficult. The doctrine, which by definition applies only to contracts cases, limits a party's defenses to those based on the explanation for nonperformance given at the time of that nonperformance or repudiation. Thus, as demonstrated by the modifications to the doctrine in insurance and brokerage contracts disputes,' 52 mend the hold represents an effort to enforce certain substantive contract law policies. In other words, because it channels the prelitigation behavior of contracting parties, "the State's objective is manifestly substantive."' 53 Put into more traditional Erie "twin aims" vernacular, this means that failing to apply the doctrine in federal court would lead both to an inequitable administration of the laws and to forum shopping, thus bringing mend the hold squarely within the substantive umbrella. First, a federal refusal to enforce mend the hold would lead to forum shopping because more defenses would be available in federal court than in state court. Depending on whether these defenses would be beneficial or not, parties will attempt to manipulate the choice of forum accordingly."
Second, by offering a more extensive menu of potential defenses, federal courts would systematically advantage nonperforming parties. Therefore, a federal refusal to enforce the docAmendment concerns, see 518 US at 432-36.
Gasperini, 518 US at 429, citing with approval S.A. Healy Co, 60 F3d at 310. In the words of the S.A Healy court: "The second class of pretty easy cases is where the state procedural rule, though undeniably 'procedural' in the ordinary sense of the term, is limited to a particular substantive area, such as contract law .... For then the state's intention to influence substantive outcomes is manifest and would be defeated by allowing parties to shift their litigation into federal court unless the state's rule was applied there as well." Id at 310 (internal citations omitted).
'"See Mangold v California Public Utilities Commission, 67 F3d 1470, 1479 (9th Cir 1995) (explaining that "the availability of a multiplier for fees in state court, but not in federal court, would likely lead to forum-shopping"). Compare Fragoso, 991 F2d at 881 ("For one thing, it is inconceivable that a defendant's differential ability, depending upon whether the suit is brought in a federal or in a commonwealth court, to invoke Puerto Rico's procedural law anent insolvent insurers after trial and entry of judgment will influence a litigant's choice of forum.").
trine would align behavioral incentives differently based only on the happenstance of diversity. The most frequently offered rationale for the mend the hold doctrine, after all, is to allow a contracting party to rely on the explanation for nonperformance given by the other party as exclusive. Thus, if a party wishes to save the deal, she may cure the cited defect with the assurance that the mend the hold doctrine will protect her from other reasons for nonperformance hidden in the background. 55 But if federal courts refuse to enforce mend the hold, then contracting parties of diverse citizenship would proceed without the doctrine's protection from unmentioned problems. Such an inequitable administration of the law is not tolerable under the Erie doctrine.' 56 2. Erie and the minority (postlitigation) version of mend the hold.
The minority version of the rule becomes relevant only once litigation has begun. " ' Even then it permits a party to change positions based on new information or other good faith reasons. 5 8 Thus, a state's interest in the minority version of mend the hold is not as obviously substantive; the rule has a strong procedural flavor.
But the minority version applies during the litigation of contract disputes only, which suggests that it is a substantive rule.' 5 9 "See, for example, Nashville Marketplace Co, 1990 Tenn App LEXIS 212 at *16 ("Nashville Marketplace could have attempted to cure these problems before the expiration of the earn-out period had they been mentioned in the rejection notice."); Duclos, 6 NE at 790 ("No such objection was taken at the time by the defendants, and, had it been, the difficulty, no doubt, would have been obviated at once by the [broker]").
'"See Mangold, 67 F3d at 1479 ("As this case illustrates, if a multiplier is procedural, a significant difference in fees would be available in state court but not in federal courtan Inequitable administration of the law.'). Compare Fragoso, 991 F2d at 881 ("For another thing, declining to apply the Commonwealth's procedural laws here will not advantage Fragoso as compared with similarly situated, nondiverse plaintiffs.").
.lIsrael, 658 NE2d at 1191. ""Compare Cole Taylor Bank, 1994 US Dist LEXIS 3705 at *14-15 ("As pre-trial discovery revealed an alleged basis for the defenses of waiver and esteppel, this Court holds that application of the doctrine of 'mend the hold' to bar the Defendant's assertion of waiver and estoppel is not appropriate."), and Kafka v Truck Insurance Exchange, 1992 US Dist LEXIS 9440, *8 (N D Ill) (explaining that mend the hold should not "bar meritorious contract defenses where the failure to raise those defenses early-on in litigation was merely inadvertent"), referring to Larson, 116 NE2d at 192, with Cleveland Hair Clinic, Inc v Puig, 949 F Supp 595, 601 (N D I1 1996) (citing mend the hold as an alternative ground for refusing to allow a defense that the defendant had been aware of since the first pleadings), and Mellon Bank, 1994 US Dist LEXIS 15439 at *17-18 (Adopted Magistrates Opinion) (denying a party leave to amend to add a defense that it had been aware of since its original pleading but had failed to raise). "See S.A. Healy, 60 F3d at 310 ("The second class of pretty easy cases is where the state procedural rule, though undeniably 'procedural' in the ordinary sense of the term, is Its present incarnation, a corollary of the duty of good faith between contracting parties, represents a substantive choice by fllinois to treat litigants in contract disputes more strictly. Illinois expects "something more with respect to the conduct of one who enters into a solemn written engagement and then repudiates it. " 1'o Therefore, because the minority version of mend the hold is "%ound up with' the rights and obligations of' the parties, the "objectives of the Erie doctrine" militate in favor of applying the rule in federal court." 6 ' Twin aims analysis, too, suggests that the Illinois version of mend the hold is substantive. First, a federal refusal to apply the doctrine could lead to forum shopping. Because a federal court would allow greater agility during the course of the litigation, nonperforming contracting parties would systematically choose federal court over state court.' 6 2 Second, permitting the happenstance of diversity to dictate whether the implied duty of good faith continues into the litigation context results in an inequitable administration of the laws." To be sure, the Illinois doctrine is less clearly a substantive rule of law than the majority version. Nonetheless, even the Illinois version of mend the hold advances a substantive policy-holding contracting parties to a higher standard." M Therefore, without a conflicting federal policy, federal courts sitting in diversity should enforce the Illinois version of mend the hold when Illinois law supplies the rule of decision.
CONCLUSION
Overlooked by modern contracts scholars, the mend the hold doctrine remains alive and well (although infrequently invoked) in a number of jurisdictions. In its majority version, the doctrine limits a contracting party's potential defenses to those based on the explanation for nonperformance asserted at the time of that nonperformance. In its minority formulation, mend the hold permits a contracting party to change its litigation position once the pleadings are complete only if that change comports with the implied duty of good faith.
The rule has mixed effects on incentives. On the one hand, it protects a party who wants to save the deal by ensuring that the other party will not raise other impediments to performance later on. On the other hand, strategically minded parties who refuse to perform will simply reserve all their defenses by refusing to give any explanation at all. Thus, it is not clear that embracing an absolutist version of the majority rule is good policy. Whether a rule is good or bad policy, however, has no bearing on whether it should control in federal diversity actions. Without a Federal Rule to preempt the doctrine's operation, and because Erie twin aims analysis suggests that mend the hold is a substantive rule of law, mend the hold represents the sort of state prerogative that federal courts sitting in diversity must respect.
